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COMMENTS
NO TOY FOR YOU! THE HEALTHY FOOD
INCENTIVES ORDINANCE: PATERNALISM
OR CONSUMER PROTECTION?
*

ALEXIS M. ETOW

The newest approach to discouraging children’s unhealthy eating habits, amidst
increasing rates of childhood obesity and other diet-related diseases, seeks to ban
something that is not even edible. In 2010, San Francisco enacted the Healthy Food
Incentives Ordinance, which prohibits toys in kids’ meals if the meals do not meet
certain nutritional requirements.
Notwithstanding the Ordinance’s impact on interstate commerce or potential
infringement on companies’ commercial speech rights and on parents’ rights to
determine what their children eat, this Comment argues that the Ordinance does not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment, or substantive due
process. The irony is that although the Ordinance likely avoids the constitutional
hurdles that hindered earlier measures aimed at childhood obesity, it intrudes on civil
liberties more than its predecessors. This Comment analyzes the legality of the Healthy
Food Incentives Ordinance to understand its implications on subsequent legislation
aimed at combating childhood obesity and on the progression of public health law.

* Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 61; J.D.
Candidate, May 2013, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., Psychology,
2007, Princeton University. Many thanks to my Comment adviser Professor Lindsay
Wiley for her invaluable guidance and insights; Professor Vladeck and Professor
Marcus for their helpful input; the members of the American University Law Review for
all their support and hard work during the editing process and publication of this
piece, especially Julia Boisvert, Mary Gardner, Chris Walsh, and Brian Westley; and to
my friends and family, particularly my parents and sister, for their constant moral
support.

1503

ETOW.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1504

6/14/2012 7:09 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1503

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .......................................................................................1505
I. Background .............................................................................1509
A. The Impetus for the Healthy Food Ordinance ...............1509
1. Early government efforts aimed at childhood
obesity ..........................................................................1509
2. The food industry’s role: allowing the fox to guard
the henhouse ..............................................................1510
3. The use of toys to attract child consumers ................1511
B. Taking a Different Approach: The Healthy Food
Ordinance .........................................................................1512
C. Constitutional Issues Implicated by the Ordinance .......1513
1. Modern dormant Commerce Clause .........................1513
2. Commercial speech and the First Amendment ........1516
3. Substantive due process and the Fourteenth
Amendment ................................................................1519
II. The Healthy Food Ordinance Survives Constitutional
Challenge Because it is Narrowly Tailored, Advances
Compelling Interests, and Does Not Unduly Burden
Interstate ..................................................................................1521
A. Effect on Interstate Commerce .......................................1521
B. Restraint on Commercial Speech ....................................1525
1. Regulating what restaurants sell, not what they say ..1525
2. Marketing partnerships ..............................................1526
3. Surviving Central Hudson .............................................1527
C. Interference with Substantive Due Process .....................1530
1. Using Lorillard and West Coast Hotel to frame San
Francisco’s compelling interests ................................1532
2. The Ordinance’s narrow-tailoring .............................1534
III. What is Next? Response to the Ordinance and Future
Implications .............................................................................1535
A. National Impact: Additional Legal Measures and
Industry Changes ..............................................................1535
B. Potential Regulatory Responses .......................................1537
1. Setting a price floor ....................................................1537
2. Instituting an excise tax ..............................................1539
C. Implications of the Ordinance and Future Measures ....1540
Conclusion .........................................................................................1542

ETOW.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 7:09 PM

THE HEALTHY FOOD INCENTIVES ORDINANCE

1505

INTRODUCTION
A colleague told us of her four-year-old daughter at the
supermarket seeing Betty Crocker’s Disney Princess Fruit Snacks
with Cinderella, Snow White, and the Little Mermaid on the box.
Daughter: “I want that.”
Mother: “What is it?”
1
Daughter: “I don’t know.”

As the anecdote above portrays, children are heavily influenced by
2
the food industry’s commercial tactics without even realizing it.
Recognizing children’s lucrative vulnerability, fast food marketers
spend over $660 million each year on sales strategies that directly
3
target children as young as three years old.
These marketing
practices combined with the prevalence of unhealthy foods in
supermarkets and fast food restaurants have contributed to alarming
4
trends in children’s health. Fast food restaurants have commonly
been named one of the primary culprits for providing high-calorie,
low-nutrient foods that come with excessive sodium and saturated fat,
5
which lead to obesity and other diet-related diseases. Not only are
more meals consumed outside the home today, but children
6
consume almost twice as many calories when they eat out.
1. KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT 107 (2004).
2. See Tracy Westen, Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: The
Federal Trade Commission and the Kid-Vid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 79 (2006)
(revealing that children do not understand that marketing techniques are
commercially motivated).
3. JENNIFER L. HARRIS ET AL., YALE RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY, FAST FOOD
F.A.C.T.S.: EVALUATING FAST FOOD NUTRITION AND MARKETING TO YOUTH 12 (2010),
available at http://fastfoodmarketing.org/media/FastFoodFACTS_Report.pdf.
4. See James O. Hill et al., Modifying the Environment to Reverse Obesity, 2005 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 108, 109 (asserting that marketing unhealthy foods directly to
children is a contributing factor to today’s rising obesity rates).
5. See Jonathan Berr, Lawsuit Threat: McDonald’s Happy Meal Toys Make Kids Fat,
DAILYFINANCE.COM
(June 22, 2010, 5:20 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/06/22/mcdonaldshappy-meal-toys-lawsuit/ (noting that some health experts hold McDonald’s and
other fast food purveyors partly culpable for America’s obesity epidemic); see also
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 128 (explaining that over thirty percent of fast food
calories consist of sugar and saturated fat—empty calories that far surpass children’s
daily recommended caloric intake). Childhood obesity rates have nearly tripled in
the past thirty years, and diet-related diseases such as hypertension, heart disease,
high cholesterol, and type 2 diabetes have similarly skyrocketed. See INST. OF MED.,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO PREVENT CHILDHOOD OBESITY 1 (2009) (reporting
that the high prevalence of childhood obesity is likely to decrease the life expectancy
and quality of life for today’s generation of children).
6. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 116 (finding that of the 689 sampled
parents with children two to eleven years old, sixty-six percent took their children to
McDonald’s on at least a few occasions a month, and twenty-two percent went at least
once a week); Devon E. Winkles, Comment, Weighing the Value of Information: Why the
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In response to these pressing diet-related concerns, the law can be
7
a powerful and necessary tool for protecting children’s health.
Equally important is our constitutional framework, which ensures
that these legal strategies do not unjustifiably infringe upon civil
8
liberties.
Constitutional safeguards played a central role in
hampering early attempts to combat childhood obesity, such as
9
efforts to eliminate advertisements targeting child audiences. As a
result, some states and municipalities have turned to developing new
and more innovative ways to address childhood obesity and diet10
related illnesses.
In 2010, Santa Clara County and the city of San Francisco made
history by passing the first-ever local ordinances that prohibit
restaurants from providing free toys in meals for children that do not
11
meet established nutritional requirements. Despite well-intentioned
interests, the ordinances have generated substantial concerns and
criticism from the food industry and members of the public who
accuse San Francisco and Santa Clara County of creating the ultimate
“nanny state”—telling children they cannot have a toy unless “they
12
eat their fruits and vegetables.” Even former Mayor Gavin Newsom
of San Francisco opposed the ban, alleging that it inappropriately
interferes with the role of parents who have the ultimate right and
Federal Government Should Require Nutrition Labeling for Food Served in Restaurants, 59
EMORY L.J. 549, 552 (2009) (revealing that while children consume an average of 420
calories when they eat a meal at home, they consume an average of 770 calories
when they eat out).
7. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 29
(2d ed. 2008) (claiming that public health law can offer “innovative solutions to the
most implacable health problems”). Lawrence Gostin delineates seven ways that the
government or private citizens can protect the public’s health through the law,
including: taxation; alteration of the informational environment, built environment,
or socioeconomic environment; direct regulation; indirect or tort regulation; and
deregulation. See id. at 29–38 (warning that while each of these tools may be highly
beneficial to the public health, they often raise social, ethical, and legal concerns
that require thorough attention and analysis).
8. See Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the “Old”
Public Health, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S138, S149 (2003) (articulating that the
“hard question” is determining what forms of public intervention are allowable when
protected liberty interests are at stake).
9. See Westen, supra note 2, at 86 (discussing the difficulty in creating
regulations that only affect advertisements that “deceive” young children).
10. See INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 3–4 (suggesting that local governments can
improve community food access and establish public programs to combat obesity).
11. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471. to .9 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink); SANTA CLARA,
CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § A18-352 (2010).
12. The Daily Show (Comedy Central broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-january-3-2011/san-francisco-s-happymeal-ban.
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These
responsibility to determine their children’s food choices.
concerns over the paternalistic nature of the ordinances, coupled
with the ordinances’ unprecedented approach to countering
childhood obesity, raise two critical questions: (1) whether such a
regulation would survive challenges under the dormant Commerce
Clause, and commercial speech and substantive due process
14
doctrines; and, (2) if so, what its implications would be on future
15
attempts to regulate childhood obesity.
This Comment argues that, unlike earlier attempts to curtail
childhood obesity, San Francisco’s Healthy Food Incentives
Ordinance (Healthy Food Ordinance or the Ordinance) avoids the
constitutional challenges that thwarted its predecessors, yet is
ironically more indicative of paternalistic overreach. Not only is the
Ordinance more invasive than prior attempts to regulate children’s
diets, but it also sets the table for increased government intervention
16
to determine what children eat.
The constitutionality and
permissibility of the Healthy Food Ordinance, therefore, commands
further legal inquiry because of its far-reaching implications, not only
on nationwide efforts to combat obesity, but also pertaining to the
17
future of public health law.
13. Consumers opposed to the Ordinance have also voiced this concern. See
Edward Abramson, The End of the Happy Meal?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/its-not-just-baby-fat/201012/the-end-thehappy-meal (reasoning that part of the public outcry stems from parents feeling that
the Ordinance calls into question their parenting abilities); see also Berr, supra note 5
(contending that blaming fast food restaurants for childhood obesity wrongly
absolves parents of the duty to tell their children “no”).
14. See Happy Meals Banned in Santa Clara County, California, LEGAL BITES (May 3,
2010, 1:14 PM), http://www.nkms.com/legalbites/index.php/2010/05/happymeals-banned-in-santa-clara-county-california/ (raising dormant Commerce Clause
concerns because the toy bans will be unduly burdensome for nationwide
restaurants); Rachel Gordon, Plan to Limit Toys with Meals Faces First Test, S.F. CHRON.,
at A-1 (citing the industry’s Free Speech allegations); Jonathan Turley, San Francisco
Bans Happy Meals and Other Fast-Food Meals Served with Toys, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG
(Nov. 12, 2010), http://jonathanturley.org/2010/11/12/san-francisco-bans-happymeals-and-other-fast-food-meals-served-with-toys/ (indicating potential due process
claims).
15. See infra Part III (discussing the Ordinance’s immediate and potential
impacts).
16. In August 2000, New Mexico state officials took a three-year-old child into
state custody after her parents failed to treat her obesity. Shireen Arani, Comment,
State Intervention in Cases of Obesity-Related Medical Neglect, 82 B.U. L. REV. 875, 875–78
(2002). This concept of treating childhood obesity as parental abuse, combined with
the Healthy Food Ordinance’s grant of broad authority to the government to dictate
what children should eat, raises significant concerns.
17. Although this Comment does not delve into the policy implications of the
Healthy Food Ordinance, the Ordinance epitomizes the modern trend in public
health regulation that has prompted criticism from legal commentators like Richard
Epstein. Epstein contends that the government’s authority to regulate health-related
concerns should be limited to communicable diseases. See Epstein, supra note 8, at
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Part I of this Comment begins by exploring the impetus behind the
Healthy Food Ordinance, specifically the role of the government and
food industry’s past struggles to develop effective anti-obesity
strategies. It then discusses the enactment of the Healthy Food
Ordinance, which provides a new, more invasive approach to
combating childhood obesity than previously attempted. Part I ends
by summarizing the background of the constitutional doctrines
implicated by the Ordinance—the dormant Commerce Clause,
commercial speech, and substantive due process.
Part II analyzes the legality of the Ordinance under the three
constitutional doctrines introduced in Part I. First, it demonstrates
that the Ordinance does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause
because the nutritional requirements are not unduly burdensome.
Second, it delves into the question of whether the Ordinance
constitutes a restriction on commercial speech and argues that, even
if it does, it would survive intermediate scrutiny. Third, it contends
that substantive due process is the most appropriate doctrinal tool to
address the public’s concerns over the paternalistic nature of the
Ordinance but concludes that this doctrine does not pose any
substantial threat to the Ordinance.
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of the Ordinance,
focusing on companies’ changes to their marketing practices in
response to the Ordinance and on steps cities wishing to implement a
similar law might take to ensure fast food companies do not evade
the Ordinance’s directives. Part III concludes by discussing the
repercussions of our current constitutional framework under the Due
Process Clause, which, in its attempt to balance civil liberties and
government interests, permits the implementation of increasingly
innovative—and intrusive—public health regulations.

S139 (asserting that under the “new” public health regime, obesity is misleadingly
referred to as an “epidemic,” to justify government coercion). According to Epstein,
“[t]here are no non-communicable epidemics.” Id. at S154. Under the traditional
or “old” public health model, only communicable diseases, which have a singular and
definitive source, justified direct government intervention. Id. at S141. The key
question to determine whether something constitutes a public health epidemic that
requires government regulation is whether there is a system of private rights in place
to protect individuals. Id. at S143. Under this theory, obesity would not constitute a
true epidemic because tort remedies are available. Id.
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BACKGROUND

A. The Impetus for the Healthy Food Ordinance
1.

Early government efforts aimed at childhood obesity
Regulatory attempts to restrict junk food marketing targeting
children started over a quarter-century ago. In 1978, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) tried to promulgate a regulation that
18
limited children’s exposure to advertisements promoting junk food.
The FTC relied on empirical data indicating that children have not
yet developed the same cognitive abilities to differentiate commercial
19
advertising or to understand its persuasive function. Among other
restrictions, the proposed regulation sought to: “Ban all televised
advertising for any product which is directed to, or seen by, audiences
composed of a significant proportion of children who are too young
to understand the selling purpose of or otherwise comprehend or
20
evaluate the advertising.”
One of the major challenges the FTC encountered, however, was
determining which television shows to target. As the FTC discovered,
I Love Lucy was young children’s favorite show, making it difficult to
implement this regulation without also limiting adults’ exposure to
21
Moreover, a restriction on all advertisements
advertisements.
during children’s programming was excessive and highly contested
22
by both the food industry and television networks.
These legal
obstacles, combined with political opposition, forced the FTC to
23
abandon its proposed regulation. As a result, the food industry’s
18. See Westen, supra note 2, at 79 (characterizing the proposed regulations as
“the most radical agency initiative ever conceived” at the time).
19. See id. at 81 (“To a very young child, a Tony the Tiger commercial came
across as follows: ‘Hi, I’m Tony the Tiger . . . . I’m your friend, and I want you to eat
Sugar Frosted Flakes because I want you to grow up to be big and strong like me.’”).
20. The two other proposals aimed to:
(b) Ban televised advertising for sugared food products directed to, or seen
by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of older children, the
consumption of which products poses the most serious dental health risks;
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared food products not included in
Paragraph (b), which is directed to, or seen by, audiences composed of a
significant proportion of older children, to be balanced by nutritional
and/or health disclosures funded by advertisers.
43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (Apr. 27, 1978).
21. Westen, supra note 2, at 86.
22. See id. at 85 (reasoning that a complete ban on advertisements during
Saturday morning television would leave networks without any sponsorships, thereby
creating a disincentive for children’s programming).
23. See id. at 84 (explaining that when President Reagan was elected in 1980, he
appointed a new head of the FTC, who opposed the rule, thereby preventing its
enactment); id. at 86 (delineating some of the substantive problems that hampered
the proceeding, such as being unable to narrowly tailor the regulation so that it only
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24

marketing ventures today are primarily self-regulated.
2.

The food industry’s role: allowing the fox to guard the henhouse
Many of the kids’ meals offered at fast food restaurants today far
25
exceed the nutritional limits recommended by experts. While the
Institute of Medicine recommends that elementary school-age
children consume no more than 650 calories and 636 milligrams of
26
sodium in a fast food meal, a standard McDonald’s Happy Meal
containing a cheeseburger, small fries, and low-fat chocolate milk jug
contains 700 calories, 1060 milligrams of sodium, and 27 grams of
27
fat. Although some fast food chains recently pledged to advertise
28
only “better-for-you” choices to children, and in fact began offering
healthier options such as fruits, vegetables, and low-fat milk, some
29
health advocates criticize these efforts as insufficient. Prior to the
passage of the Healthy Food Ordinance, studies revealed that
30
healthier options were not provided unless specifically requested.
Instead, fast food chains like McDonald’s and Burger King would
serve French fries as the default side dish in kids’ meals at least
eighty-six percent of the time and soft drinks at least fifty percent of

restricted children’s exposure to junk food advertisements and not adults’
exposure).
24. The Obama administration recently created the Interagency Working Group
on Food Marketing to Children, which has proposed voluntary guidelines to improve
the industry’s self-regulation efforts. See Julian Pecquet, Chamber of Commerce Assails
Proposed Food Marketing Restrictions, HEALTH WATCH: THE HILL’S HEALTH CARE BLOG
(June 30, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch (contending that
even though the proposed recommendations would be voluntary, they have still
received criticism for “hav[ing] a chilling effect on commercial speech”).
25. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 47 (defining “kids’ meals” as fast food
combinations specifically designed for children that consist of a main dish, side,
beverage, and usually a toy or other premium).
26. Meanwhile, 410 calories and 544 milligrams of sodium are the acceptable
ceilings for preschool-age children. Id.
27. See MCDONALD’S, NUTRITION INFORMATION FOR MCDONALD’S HAPPY MEALS 3
(2011). These numbers reflect the nutrition information of Happy Meals prior to
the menu changes that McDonald’s made in July 2011. See infra Part III.C (discussing
the efforts made by McDonald’s to improve the wholesomeness of its Happy Meals).
28. See C.L. PEELER ET AL., THE CHILDREN’S FOOD AND BEVERAGE ADVERTISING
INITIATIVE IN ACTION: A REPORT ON COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION DURING 2008, at
19 (2009), available at http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/0/Shared%20Documents/
finalbbbs.pdf (outlining the voluntary pledge made by McDonald’s and Burger King
to only advertise their healthier offerings).
29. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at ix (suggesting that these “better-for-you”
television ads do not actually encourage healthier eating, but instead focus on
promoting the toys themselves and attaining brand loyalty); id. at 129–30 (pointing
out that restaurants could more effectively increase the sale of healthier items by
promoting them more inside the restaurant).
30. See id. at 112 (finding that nearly all fast food restaurant employees serve soda
and French fries as the default options in kids’ meals).
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31

the time. Only eleven percent of parents ordered healthier sides,
and a reported eighty-eight percent of parents claimed they were
32
unaware of these more wholesome options.
Additionally, these
“better-for-you” products were often merely added as part of the
33
backdrop in advertisements.
Therefore, despite the industry’s
seemingly commendable attempts at self-regulation, these methods
34
were ultimately ineffective.
3.

The use of toys to attract child consumers
Marketers and sociologists alike identify children as “surrogate
salesmen,” capable of convincing their parents through “pester
35
power” to buy them what they want. For fast food restaurants, the
most lucrative tool for attracting child consumers are the free toys in
kids’ meals, which receive the largest portion—$360 million—of
36
child-oriented marketing expenditures. From Transformers to 101
37
Dalmations, successful toy promotions have doubled or tripled the
38
weekly sales of kids’ meals. In 1997, an estimated four Happy Meals
were sold for every child in the United States between the ages of
31. Id. at 112–13.
32. Christina Rexrode, Happy Meals Change to Apples, Fewer Fries, WASH. TIMES (July
27,
2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/27/happy-mealschange-to-apples-fewer-fries/; see HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 113 (noting that soda
is still the most popular beverage ordered in kids’ meals and that only eight percent
of parents request plain milk instead of soda, juice, or flavored milk for their
children).
33. Instead, advertisements focused on the enticing appeal of the restaurant itself
and its toy offerings. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 59–60.
34. But see Emily Bryson York, Happy Meal Suit Raises More than Food, Marketing
Questions, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 15, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-1215/business/ct-biz-1216-mcd-suit-20101215_1_corporate-accountability-internationalban-toys-ronald-mcdonald (quoting Dawn Jackson Blatner, a dietician and
spokeswoman for the American Dietetic Association, who acknowledged that
McDonald’s Happy Meals have “come a long way” from their unwholesome past).
35. See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 43 (2001) (identifying the goal of
marketing to children as “get[ting] kids to nag their parents and nag them well”).
36. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 13. The first kids’ meal, marketed under the
name “Happy Meal,” was created in 1977 by a local advertising agency in Kansas City
and originally consisted of a hamburger, French fries, and a soda in packaging
resembling circus trains. See JOHN F. LOVE, MCDONALD’S: BEHIND THE ARCHES 313
(1986) (contending that the instant success of Happy Meals foreshadowed their
lucrative future).
37. See Kayla Webley, A Brief History of the Happy Meal, TIME (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1986073,00.html (listing some of
the most popular toy characters offered in McDonald’s Happy Meals).
38. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at 47 (citing a BRANDWEEK article claiming “the
key to attracting kids is toys, toys, toys”); see also ERIC CLARK, THE REAL TOY STORY:
INSIDE THE RUTHLESS BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S YOUNGEST CONSUMERS 148–49 (2007)
(disclosing that Wendy’s quadrupled its spending on the toys in its kids’ meals after
conducting a study revealing the significant majority of parents who are influenced
by their children’s food preferences and the influential role toys play in that
decision).
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three to nine during the first ten days of the McDonald’s Teenie
39
Beanie Baby campaign. Moreover, these promotions usually offer
numerous variations of a toy, thereby encouraging children to make
40
repeat visits to obtain the complete set.
B. Taking a Different Approach: The Healthy Food Ordinance
Recognizing the appeal of kids’ meal toys and believing more
needed to be done than the fast food industry’s self-regulated efforts
to curb unhealthy eating among children, Santa Clara County
enacted a law restricting restaurants from providing toys in kids’
meals that were excessively high in total calories, sodium, fat, and
41
sugar. The ordinance prevents any kids’ meal from providing a toy
incentive if the meal contains more than 485 calories, 600 milligrams
of sodium, thirty-five percent of total calories from fat, more than ten
percent of total calories from saturated fats, and more than ten
42
percent of calories from added sugars.
Six months later, in November 2010, San Francisco’s Board of
Supervisors voted to enact a similar ordinance, “regulat[ing] the sales
practices of restaurants physically packaging or tying a free toy (or
43
other incentive item) with unhealthy food for children.”
San
44
Francisco’s Healthy Food Incentives Ordinance, which took effect in
December 2011, requires that all meals offering a toy incentive not
45
only include a fruit and vegetable, but also contain less than: 600
39. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 149 (recounting that following the success of toy
campaigns, such as the McDonald’s Teenie Beanie Baby promotion, some joked that
fast food restaurants were “now toy stores serving food on the side”); SCHLOSSER,
supra note 35, at 47 (explaining that during the first ten days of launching its Teenie
Beanie Baby promotion, McDonald’s sold over 100 million Happy Meals, doubling its
sales).
40. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 149 (disclosing that as part of Burger King’s
Rugrats promotion, the fast food company offered twelve collectible toys and four
wristwatches, resulting in double-digit sales increases); SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at
47 (revealing that in 1999 McDonald’s offered over eighty different types of Furby
toys).
41. See Sharon Bernstein, San Francisco Bans Happy Meals, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/02/business/la-fi-happymeals-20101103 (discussing the impetus behind the Healthy Food Ordinance).
42. SANTA CLARA, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § A18-352 (2010).
43. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 to .9 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink). The
Ordinance defines “incentive item” as “any toy, game, trading card, admission ticket
or other consumer product, whether physical or digital, with particular appeal to
children and teens but not including . . . any coupon, voucher, ticket, toke, code, or
password.” Id. § 471.3.
44. The focal point of this piece is San Francisco’s ordinance.
45. Specifically, the Healthy Food Ordinance requires that qualifying meals
contain at least 0.5 cups of fruits and 0.75 cups or more of vegetables, excepting
meals served at breakfast. Id. § 471.4.
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calories, 640 milligrams of sodium, thirty-five percent of total calories
46
Unlike previous health
from fat, and ten percent saturated fat.
mandates that only placed restrictions on certain types of restaurants,
the Healthy Meal Ordinance applies to all restaurants, regardless of
how many other locations they own or whether they provide fast food
47
or sit-down service.
C. Constitutional Issues Implicated by the Ordinance
1.

Modern dormant Commerce Clause
The Ordinance warrants review under the dormant Commerce
Clause because many of the major companies affected by its
mandates are national corporations, which market products in
interstate commerce. To understand the dormant Commerce
Clause, it is necessary to start with the Commerce Clause, which
declares that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce
48
. . . among the several States.” Implicit in this doctrine is its negative
inverse, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, which limits a state
or municipality’s ability to implement regulations affecting interstate
49
50
commerce without Congress’s authority. The dormant Commerce
46. Id. The Ordinance also outlines standards for single food items, which must
contain less than thirty-five percent of total calories from fat and less than ten
percent of calories from added sugars. Id.
47. Compare id. § 471.3 (applying to any retail food establishment), with Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573
(2010) (regulating only chain restaurants operating twenty or more stores under the
same name).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 182–
83 (1824) (defining commerce as “intercourse” between and among states). To
determine whether Congress has the authority to regulate a particular activity, courts
typically ask whether it has “such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). Under
the Commerce Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate both the channels—
such as highways, rivers, railroads, and airways—as well as the instrumentalities—
including trucks, boats, trains, and airplanes—that transport commerce. United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
49. Modern jurisprudence pertaining to the Commerce Clause reveals divergent
interpretations of where to draw the line between commercial and non-economic
activities. Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (reasoning
that gender-based violence was not commerce and therefore could not be regulated
by Congress), and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 561 (narrowing the definition of “interstate
commerce” and determining that a federal law prohibiting individuals from
knowingly possessing a gun in a school zone did not substantially affect interstate
commerce and was therefore unconstitutional), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
25–26 (2005) (holding it constitutional for Congress to regulate commerce among
the states by prohibiting the cultivation and possession of medicinal marijuana).
50. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir.
2003) (explaining that “although the [Commerce] Clause is phrased as an
affirmative grant of congressional power, it is well established that it contains a
negative or ‘dormant’ aspect” that restricts states from unjustifiably discriminating
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Clause, therefore, acts as a safeguard against economic protectionism
51
by the states.
In modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has identified three scenarios in which it will
52
invalidate a state or municipal law.
First, if a law is overtly
discriminatory against out-of-state commerce, it is considered per se
53
54
invalid. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court overturned a
New Jersey statute that explicitly restricted the importation of most
out-of-state solid waste to reduce the prevalence of landfills in the
55
state. The Court explained that a law, such as the one at issue,
which “overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State’s
56
borders,” is subject to a stricter standard of judicial review.
Second, if a state or municipal law is facially neutral, it may still
violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it has a discriminatory effect
57
or purpose.
For example, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
58
Advertising Commission, the Court held that North Carolina’s statute
regarding the labeling of apple containers violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because it placed an unconstitutional burden on
59
the State of Washington, the nation’s largest producer of apples.
The statute in question prevented apple producers from using any
label on their apple containers unless it followed the United States
against or excessively burdening interstate commerce).
51. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521–22 (1935) (asserting that
states and local regulations may not place an undue burden on interstate
commerce); Am. Marine Rail NJ, LLC v. City of Bayonne, 289 F. Supp. 2d 569, 578
(D.N.J. 2003) (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988))
(alleging that the dormant Commerce Clause’s purpose is to prevent states from
favoring in-state commerce at the expense of out-of-state economies).
52. Lauren F. Gizzi, Comment, State Menu-Labeling Legislation: A Dormant Giant
Waiting to be Awoken by Commerce Clause Challenges, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 501, 506
(2009).
53. Id. at 510.
54. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
55. See id. at 625 (believing that this would prevent environmental hazards
associated with improper waste disposal).
56. See id. at 624 (alleging that overt attempts to regulate interstate commerce
constitute pure “economic protectionism”).
57. Gizzi, supra note 52, at 511.
58. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
59. See id. at 350–52 (reasoning that the discriminatory nature of the statute
unlawfully imposed a greater financial burden on Washington apple producers by:
requiring them to change their labels solely for containers shipped to North
Carolina; preventing them from advertising their stricter standards for apple quality
in North Carolina; forcing them to lower their standards to those outlined in the
USDA; and providing a competitive advantage for North Carolina growers who only
had to comply with one labeling standard). A multi-million dollar operation,
Washington’s commercial production and sale of apples contributed substantially to
its economy. Id. at 336. Washington apple producers shipped 500,000 containers of
apples to North Carolina each year. Id. at 337.
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60

This substantially
Department of Agriculture’s grading system.
burdened states, such as Washington, which used their own industry61
accepted grading system.
Third, even if the state or municipal law is not discriminatory on its
face, in its effect, or in its purpose, it may be deemed
unconstitutional if its burden on interstate commerce outweighs the
62
state’s purported interests. Statutes that do not directly discriminate
against out-of-state commerce are subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church,
63
64
Inc. balancing test.
In Pike, the Supreme Court held that an
Arizona law preventing local cantaloupe from being packaged out-ofstate violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the state’s
interest in promoting the reputation of Arizona growers did not
outweigh the economic burden imposed upon the respondent
65
cantaloupe grower. The Pike balancing test was again utilized in
66
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki. There, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deemed the section of New
York’s Public Health Statute prohibiting cigarette sellers and
common contract carriers from selling and distributing cigarettes
directly to New York consumers constitutional under the dormant
67
Commerce Clause.
Applying the Pike balancing test, the court
determined that the statute’s interference with interstate commerce
was not excessive in light of the state’s substantial interest in
protecting the health of its minors by limiting their access to
68
cigarettes.

60. See id. at 336 (asserting that the state of Washington’s grading system was at
least equivalent, if not superior, to the standards developed by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture).
61. See id. at 338 (ruling that North Carolina’s grading restrictions would unduly
burden Washington State apple producers because it would require them to
abandon their already-established, well-recognized, and highly expensive grading
system).
62. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–74 (1981)
(upholding a state ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers because its
principal purpose sought to conserve natural resources and prevent solid waste
disposal problems, not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce).
63. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
64. See id. at 142 (establishing that such statutes will be upheld as long as their
subsequent burdens do not outweigh the government interest involved and this
interest could not be achieved through less burdensome means).
65. See id. at 144, 146 (contending that the law may have been upheld had the
government’s interest been more compelling).
66. 320 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003).
67. Id. at 217.
68. See id. (reasoning that the statute’s effects on interstate commerce were de
minimis and incidental “at most” because it only limited one method for selling
cigarettes to smokers in New York and did not “obstruct or impede the flow of
cigarettes into New York State”).
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2.

Commercial speech and the First Amendment
The Ordinance has also generated concerns that it unlawfully
69
infringes on companies’ commercial speech rights. Just because a
product is bought or sold, however, does not automatically qualify the
70
related speech as commercial. Two important factors in identifying
commercial speech are the existence of a speaker—typically the
71
seller—and an audience—the consumer. The Supreme Court has
consistently identified commercial speech as expression that does “no
72
more than propose a commercial transaction,” involves the
73
economic interest of the seller and consumer, and is likely to
74
influence the consumer’s commercial decision-making.
Traditionally, commercial speech was not considered a guaranteed
75
right under the First Amendment
of the United States
76
77
Constitution. Not until Bigelow v. Virginia did the Supreme Court
recognize that the First Amendment’s protection of speech extended
78
to paid commercial advertisements. Concerned about paternalism,
the Court reasoned that, while in some cases advertising “may be
subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public
interest[,]” it should not be “stripped of all First Amendment
79
protection.” The Court reaffirmed this position the following year

69. Gordon, supra note 14.
70. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (holding that
although donations were sought, selling religious literature did not constitute a
commercial activity that could be restricted by the government).
71. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099
(2003), dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted).
72. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973).
73. See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720, 732 (Cal. 2000)
(referencing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980)).
74. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262 (explaining that regardless of the subject of the
speech under question, it is considered commercial if it will sway the consumer to
make a desired commercial decision).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
76. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (recognizing that the
Constitution imposes no restraint upon the government with respect to the
regulation of “purely commercial advertising”); see also Nicki Kennedy, Comment,
Stop in the Name of Public Policy: Limiting “Junk Food” Advertisements During Children’s
Programming, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 503, 507 (2008) (explaining that the
Supreme Court did not view commercial speech as constitutionally protected until
1975).
77. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
78. See id. at 818 (ruling that there should not be a blanket restriction against
advertisements receiving First Amendment protection merely because they appear in
the form of an advertisement).
79. Id. at 826.
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in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
80
Inc., ruling that speech merely proposing a commercial transaction
81
deserves at least some protection under the First Amendment.
Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
82
Service Commission of New York, the Court developed the current test
to determine whether restrictions on commercial speech are
83
Only commercial
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
speech that is lawful and not false or misleading is subject to First
84
Amendment protection. Thus, determining whether the expression
in question is inherently deceptive or misleading is the first step in
85
the four-pronged Central Hudson test. Second, a court must assess
86
whether the asserted government interest is substantial. Third, the
limitation on commercial speech must directly advance the
87
government’s interest. And finally, the regulation must be narrowly
tailored, meaning it must be no more extensive than necessary to
88
serve that interest.
89
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court employed the
Central Hudson test to overturn state regulations limiting the way
manufacturers marketed, sold, and distributed cigars and smokeless
90
tobacco products in Massachusetts. The regulations at issue banned
80. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
81. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
82. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
83. Id. at 566. The Central Hudson test applies a form of intermediate scrutiny.
See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality
of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 860 (2010)
(characterizing the Central Hudson test as falling between strict scrutiny review, which
courts apply to review restrictions on other forms of speech, and rational basis
review, which courts reserve for regulations that do not censure speech).
84. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (articulating that this is the threshold
question of commercial speech analysis).
85. See id. (applying step one of the four-part test to determine that the
expression under question was neither inaccurate nor unlawful).
86. See id. at 568–69 (asserting that the government’s two goals in banning an
electrical utility’s promotional advertising—ensuring energy conservation and fair
utility—constituted substantial interests, consequently passing the second prong of
the test).
87. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188
(1999) (“[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”).
88. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (explaining that
to satisfy the Central Hudson test, the law under question must be a “reasonable fit”
between the government’s substantial interest and the means with which it seeks to
achieve that interest).
89. 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001).
90. See id. at 565–66 (declaring that Massachusetts’s regulations on the outdoor
and point-of-sale advertising of tobacco failed the third and fourth steps of the
Central Hudson test).
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outdoor advertisements promoting cigars or smokeless tobacco
within a 1000-foot radius of any school or playground in
91
Massachusetts. Although the state had a substantial and compelling
interest in preventing minors’ tobacco usage, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Massachusetts Attorney General failed to prove
that these regulations were not more extensive than necessary, as
92
required by the fourth prong of Central Hudson test. Likewise, the
Court deemed the restrictions prohibiting stores from displaying
tobacco advertisements lower than five feet from the floor an
93
unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech. It reasoned that
the “blanket height restriction [did] not constitute a reasonable fit”
94
with the state’s aim to decrease underage tobacco usage.
In one of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions addressing
the protection of speech under the First Amendment, Sorrell v. IMS
95
Health Inc., the Court determined that Vermont’s law restricting the
sale and use of physicians’ prescriber-identifying information
96
triggered heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Contrary to the majority, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion argued
that the statute constituted nothing more than an economic
regulation and should instead be subject to intermediate scrutiny
97
under Central Hudson. The Court, however, ultimately adopted a
very broad definition of speech, characterizing the “creation and
dissemination of information [as] speech within the meaning of the
98
First Amendment.”

91. See id. at 561 (finding that the Massachusetts Attorney General
inappropriately based this blanket regulation on a prior FDA ruling implementing
the same requirements without adequately considering the diverse impacts these
restrictions would have on varying geographical landscapes).
92. See id. at 565 (pointing out that even though the regulations had the wellintentioned aim of restricting children’s exposure to tobacco, they would completely
and unfairly eliminate lawful advertising to adult consumers in some parts of
Massachusetts).
93. Id. at 567.
94. See id. at 566–67 (reasoning that the height requirement was arbitrary and
illogical because not all children are under five-feet tall and even if they were, the
displays would still be visible to them).
95. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
96. Id. at 2659.
97. See id. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Vermont’s statute neither forbids nor
requires anyone to say anything, to engage in any form of symbolic speech, or to
endorse any particular point of view.”). Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has characterized prescriber-identifying information—at issue in
Sorrell—as “a mere ‘commodity’ with no greater entitlement to First Amendment
protection than ‘beef jerky.’” Id. at 2666 (majority opinion) (citing IMS Health Inc.
v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008)).
98. Id. at 2667.
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3.

Substantive due process and the Fourteenth Amendment
Finally, the Ordinance calls into question the permissibility of San
99
Francisco’s authority to determine what children should eat —a role
100
traditionally reserved for parents.
San Francisco’s proposal
generated much debate among consumers, consumer advocacy and
101
health organizations, and the food industry regarding this issue.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
forbids the states from depriving any individual of “life, liberty, or
102
property, without due process of law.” The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is elemental in ensuring that states and
municipalities do not overstep their bounds when exercising their
103
police powers.
In determining whether a law violates substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court first determines
104
whether the liberty interest at issue is a fundamental right.
The
99. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 to .9 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink).
100. See Abramson, supra note 13 (“Feeding our child is an essential part of our
responsibility as a loving parent [sic].”).
101. Part of the challenge in imposing restrictions on fast food in the name of
combating obesity is that there are numerous “contributing” factors. See Sharon
Bernstein, Happy Meal Toys Could Be Banned in Santa Clara County, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/27/business/la-fi-happy-meals20100427
(quoting Daniel Conway, spokesman for the California Restaurant Association, who
claimed that if the government “wants to take away the toys that are making kids fat,
take away Xboxes, take away PlayStations, take away flat-screen TVs”).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause covers both
procedural due process—which protects an individual’s right to fair and impartial
legal proceedings—and substantive due process—which safeguards an individual’s
liberties from government interference and is subsequently the focus of this section.
See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (defining procedural due
process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (defining substantive
due process). For the purposes of this Comment, this section will only touch upon
the principles of substantive due process that are most relevant to examining the
tension between parents’ fundamental right to take care of their children and the
state’s authority to promote the health and well-being of its citizens.
103. “Police powers” refer to the authority states delegate to cities and
municipalities, allowing them to implement regulations that best protect and
promote the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. See Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (providing examples of the traditional police powers such as,
“[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and order”);
Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention: How Far
Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89 (Supp. s1 2011) (defining “police power”
as “the authority to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of the community”).
Here, the California Constitution has explicitly delegated such police powers to its
cities, including San Francisco. See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (“A county or city may
make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”).
104. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (right to refuse
medical treatment is a fundamental right); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383
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type of asserted interest indicates which level of judicial review the
105
If the interest at issue is not a fundamental
court should apply.
right, the court applies a more flexible standard, rational basis review,
which asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate
106
government purpose.
Under rational basis review, the party
107
As
challenging the legality of the law holds the burden of proof.
long as the court believes the government sought to achieve a
legitimate purpose through reasonable means, it will uphold the
108
constitutionality of the law at issue.
On the other hand, if the court deems the asserted interest a
fundamental right, it must apply strict scrutiny to determine whether
the law in question is necessary to further a compelling government
109
interest.
Under strict scrutiny review, the government has the
burden of proof to demonstrate that the law at issue was necessary to
110
achieve its compelling interest.
To be considered “necessary,” the
law must be narrowly tailored—that is, not more burdensome than

(1978) (right to marriage is a fundamental right); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965)
(right to control reproduction is a fundamental right).
105. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503–04 (White, J., concurring) (acknowledging the
importance of characterizing the nature of the right at issue to determine the proper
level of judicial review).
106. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law need
not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
107. The challenger must prove that the law does not advance any legitimate
government interest or is not a reasonable means to attain that interest. See FCC v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (explaining that because an
issue receiving rational basis review holds a “strong presumption of validity,” the
party challenging its legality has “the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis that
might support it’” (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
364 (1973))).
108. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court determined that there was no
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide because it was not deeply rooted in
historical, legal traditions, and, on the contrary, had been universally criminalized
throughout history. 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997). The Court ultimately upheld the
Washington law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, finding that it reasonably
served several legitimate government interests—including preserving human life;
preventing suicide; protecting “the integrity and ethics of the medical profession;”
safeguarding vulnerable groups, such as the impoverished, elderly, and terminally ill;
and avoiding a slippery slope effect that would lead to voluntary, or even involuntary
euthanasia. Id. at 728–32.
109. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that a compelling
interest is one “of the highest order” that would legitimize infringing upon a
fundamental liberty); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (establishing that a stricter level of scrutiny ought to be applied to cases that
facially appear to violate the Constitution, hinder the political process, or
discriminate against “discrete and insular minorities”).
110. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 341 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the government had the burden to prove that detention supported a
legitimate interest).
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necessary to achieve the government’s ends; otherwise, it will fail
111
strict scrutiny.
While due process is essential to protecting the liberty interests of
citizens from states’ or municipalities’ unlawful exercise of police
powers, clearly defining what constitutes a protected liberty interest is
112
less straightforward.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly
asserted what constitutes a “compelling” government interest, but it
has acknowledged that a state or municipality may interfere with
citizens’ fundamental rights, if such interference is necessary to
113
protect “health, safety, and general welfare.” For example, in West
114
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court held that the government’s
attempt to prevent the unlawful exploitation of female workers was
compelling for two reasons—such exploitation not only adversely
affected the workers themselves, but also burdened taxpayers who
115
were forced to pay what the workers lost in wages. Citing these two
compelling interests, the Court subsequently upheld the
116
constitutionality of the minimum wage law in question.
II. THE HEALTHY FOOD ORDINANCE SURVIVES CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE BECAUSE IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED, ADVANCES
COMPELLING INTERESTS, AND DOES NOT UNDULY BURDEN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
A. Effect on Interstate Commerce
Because many of the companies affected by the Healthy Food
Ordinance are national corporations, the Ordinance invariably
111. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (finding that while the government had a compelling
interest to compensate victims of crimes, the statute was not narrowly tailored to
achieve this end and consequentially unconstitutional).
112. Only the first eight amendments of the Constitution enumerate protected
individual rights. U.S. CONST. amends. I–VIII. For asserted interests not included in
the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court must rely on precedent to
determine whether the interest is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion); or essential to “define one’s own concept of existence,” Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
113. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (determining that the compulsory education law did
not constitute a compelling interest because it was not necessary to protect the
health and welfare of children).
114. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
115. Id. at 399.
116. See id. at 400 (affirming the Supreme Court of Washington’s judgment to
validate a state law aimed at protecting women and minors from unjust working
conditions).
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affects interstate commerce and therefore warrants review under the
dormant Commerce Clause. For a local law to withstand a challenge
under the dormant Commerce Clause, the state or municipality—in
this case San Francisco—must have a substantial local interest that
117
does not impose excessive burdens on interstate commerce.
On its face, the Healthy Food Ordinance does not discriminate
against out-of-state interests, nor is it motivated by simple economic
protectionism, as was the case of the government actions at issue in
118
City of Philadelphia and Hunt. Unlike the New Jersey statute at issue
in City of Philadelphia, which drew territorial distinctions that
unlawfully excluded the importation of solid or liquid waste from
119
other states, the Healthy Food Ordinance does not prevent certain
restaurants from providing toys in kids’ meals because they are out-of120
state companies. Instead, it focuses on the nutritional quality of the
meal itself, regardless of whether the restaurant is a local business or
121
Nor does the Healthy Food Ordinance have a
nationwide chain.
discriminatory purpose or effect like the North Carolina statute that
122
was struck down in Hunt. Its stated intent is “to improve the health
of children and adolescents in San Francisco by setting healthy
nutritional standards for children’s meals sold at restaurants in
117. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981)
(holding that a law interfering with interstate commerce is constitutional unless its
burden on interstate commerce significantly outweighs a state’s legitimate interests);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (overturning an Arizona law
imposing strict requirements on the production and packaging of fruits and
vegetables shipped to other states because the burdens outweighed the state’s de
minimis interest to promote its growers’ reputations).
118. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (finding a New Jersey
law facially discriminatory and therefore in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977)
(overruling a North Carolina law because of its discriminatory effect).
119. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618.
120. Similar to the statute at issue in Clover Leaf Creamery, the Healthy Food
Ordinance ensures a legitimate state interest—protecting children’s health—as
opposed to promoting “simple economic protectionism,” as was the case in City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
121. The Healthy Food Ordinance is similar to the Maryland statute preventing
petroleum producers or refiners from operating retail service stations in Maryland in
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 120–21 (1978). There, the Court
pointed out that “Maryland’s entire gasoline supply flows in interstate commerce and
since there are no local producers or refiners, such claims of disparate treatment
between interstate and local commerce would be meritless.” Id. at 125.
122. Compare S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 to 471.9 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (explaining
that promoting healthier menu options at fast food restaurants is the impetus behind
the Healthy Food Ordinance), with Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53 (ruling that a North
Carolina law was unconstitutional because of its discriminatory effect), and Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 676–78 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(deeming an Iowa statute unlawful because it had a discriminatory purpose).
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123

combination with free toys or other incentive items.” Additionally,
the law does not place this burden solely on large chain restaurants,
but instead broadly defines “restaurant” as any “establishment that . . .
124
prepares food for human consumption at the retail level.”
Therefore, a restriction prohibiting restaurants from providing toys
in kids’ meals that fail to meet the established nutritional
125
requirements burdens both local and out-of-state businesses.
Based on modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Healthy Food Ordinance would likely pass constitutional muster
under the Pike balancing test because the Ordinance advances a
legitimate state interest that outweighs any potential burdens on
126
interstate commerce. Unlike the statute at issue in Pike, which was
127
solely driven by the state’s economic interests, the Healthy Food
Ordinance is a public health issue, an area “where the propriety of
128
local regulation has long been recognized.”
The Healthy Food
Ordinance more closely resembles the New York law regulating the
129
shipment and sale of cigarettes that was upheld in Pataki. Not only
do the Healthy Food Ordinance and the New York statute in Pataki
share the same governmental interest—safeguarding the health of
minors by limiting their exposure to products deemed to adversely
affect their health—but this concern outweighs the de minimis
130
effects both statutes have on interstate economies.
123. HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.2.
124. Id. § 471.3.
125. In upholding the Minnesota statute at issue in Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court
noted that a law’s detrimental impacts on its own, in-state economic interests usually
indicate an absence of economic protectionism. 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981).
126. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126 (clarifying that a state regulation’s impact on
interstate commerce does not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause). Central to assessing whether a state or municipality has the
power to regulate interstate commerce is the question of whether the state or
municipality’s interest is deemed sufficient to justify this commercial interference.
Id. As articulated by the Court in Clover Leaf Creamery: “[o]nly if the burden on
interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State’s legitimate purposes does such a
regulation violate the Commerce Clause.” 449 U.S. at 474.
127. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (explaining that the
Arizona act was passed to prevent tarnishing the reputation and returns of Arizona
growers).
128. See id. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 796 (1945) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
129. Compare S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.4 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (regulating
incentives at all restaurants in the county), with Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that preventing direct
shipment of cigarettes to the consumer places was a “de minimis burden on
interstate commerce” because it “applies evenhandedly to both in-state and out-ofstate businesses and does not impede the flow of goods in interstate commerce”).
130. In Pataki, both parties agreed that a state has a legitimate interest in
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Recent initiatives by fast food purveyors to improve the nutritional
quality of kids’ meals tip the Pike balancing scale in favor of the
131
Restaurants affected by the Ordinance
Healthy Food Ordinance.
could still argue that it imposes an undue burden because they would
have to change their business operations and marketing campaign
only in the counties that have enacted the Healthy Food
132
Ordinance.
This contention is severely weakened by fast food
restaurants’ recent attempts to offer and promote more wholesome
133
kids’ meals.
In light of these already-proposed improvements, fast
food purveyors would avoid the burdensome task of having to
134
reinvent their menus as a result of the new regulations. Moreover,
some of these restaurants already offer several existing combinations
that satisfy all but the Healthy Food Ordinance’s vegetable
135
requirement.
protecting the health of its citizens by restricting minors’ access to cigarettes and,
more generally, decreasing cigarette consumption. See 320 F.3d at 217 (declaring
that the New York statute at issue effectively promotes this interest and only has
incidental effects on interstate commerce).
131. See Happy Meal Gets a Makeover, THE CHART (July 26, 2011, 1:35 PM),
http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/ (reporting that “[t]he new Happy Meal with four
pieces of McNuggets, apple slices, smaller French Fries and 1% milk has 410 calories,
19 grams of fat and 560 milligrams of sodium”); see also infra Part III.A (detailing
some of the industry’s menu changes following the passage of the Ordinance).
132. Not only would companies have to make concessions for the counties that
have enacted similar bans, but they would have to make further adjustments
depending on the nutritional standards established by the state or municipality. For
example, the bill proposed by Councilman Leroy Comrie in New York City sets
stricter standards than those required in San Francisco. Each meal would have to
contain less than 500 calories and 600 milligrams of sodium, as opposed to San
Francisco’s 600 calorie and 640 milligrams of sodium maximums. Compare Meredith
Melnick, New York City Council Considers Banning Happy Meal Toys, TIME
(Apr. 6, 2011), http://healthland.time.com/2011/04/06/new-york-city-councilconsiders-banning-happy-meal-toys/ (summarizing New York City’s proposed
standards), with S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.4 (2011),
available at http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health
Code” hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink)
(outlining San Francisco’s nutritional requirements).
133. Presumably, companies like McDonald’s and Burger King have already
changed their marketing campaign, advertising only their healthier items to
children. See PEELER, supra note 28, at 19 (outlining the pledge to only advertise
healthier offerings that fast food companies like McDonald’s and Burger King have
volunteered to follow).
134. See infra Part III.A (noting several fast food companies’ attempts to improve
the nutritional quality of their kids’ meals). In July 2011, McDonald’s announced its
short-term and long-term goals to continue making Happy Meals healthier for
children by significantly reducing sodium, added sugars, saturated fats, and calories.
Happy Meal Gets a Makeover, supra note 131. Moreover, these changes are purportedly
voluntary, as opposed to being instigated by the Healthy Food Ordinance. See
Rexrode, supra note 32 (quoting Cindy Goody, the senior director of nutrition for
McDonald’s, who denied that the Happy Meal changes resulted from recent
regulations like the Healthy Food Ordinance).
135. With the addition of a vegetable, the new McDonald’s Happy Meal
containing four pieces of chicken McNuggets, apples slices, French fries, and one-
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Opponents might also challenge the Ordinance’s legality under
the dormant Commerce Clause by portraying the link between the
consumption of kids’ meals and childhood obesity as tenuous at
136
best. Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, suggests
that if the law affecting interstate commerce is an attempt to protect
public health or safety, it will likely be upheld because states have
traditionally assumed the duty of ensuring the well-being of their
137
citizens. Courts are more lenient toward laws protecting the health
and safety of citizens even if their effects are slight and the means of
138
achieving those results are not wholly direct.
B. Restraint on Commercial Speech
While the Healthy Food Ordinance does not unlawfully impinge
on the dormant Commerce Clause, it is susceptible to First
Amendment challenges. However, unlike prior attempts to regulate
child-targeted marketing, the Ordinance does not run afoul of the
commercial speech doctrine because the Ordinance is narrowly
tailored and directly advances a substantial government interest.
1.

Regulating what restaurants sell, not what they say
Similar to companies who use cartoon characters in their
139
advertisements to directly appeal to children, some fast food
companies provide free toy giveaways in kids’ meals as a marketing
140
While both
tool to entice children to buy their products.
advertisements and premiums targeted at children share the same

percent milk would be able to contain a toy under the Ordinance’s health
requirements. Happy Meal Gets a Makeover, supra note 131.
136. See Hill, supra note 4, at 108–09 (“[F]ew studies have been conducted to
identify the specific factors in the current environment that facilitate obesity.”).
137. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 687 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for “intrud[ing] upon the
fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the safety of their citizens”);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28–29 (1905) (granting greater judicial
deference to state regulation pertaining to public health concerns); see also Gizzi,
supra note 52, at 509 (asserting that issues concerning the public well-being are
“quintessential” subjects of state or local, as opposed to federal, regulation).
138. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir.
2003) (maintaining that even if the regulations only slightly decrease the sale of
cigarettes to minors, the underlying government interest was foremost to the
regulations being upheld).
139. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558 (2001) (noting the
significant increase in tobacco products purchased by youths following the
introduction of Joe Camel).
140. Roy Bergold, the former head of advertising at McDonald’s, stated that
“companies have found that kids are a lot more tempted by the toys than the food.”
Roy T. Bergold, Jr., The Obesity Debate, QSR MAGAZINE (Nov. 2010),
http://www.qsrmagazine.com/roy-bergold/obesity-debate.
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goals—appealing to children to establish brand loyalty and increase
consumption—the Healthy Food Ordinance is meaningfully different
from prior attempts to restrict child-targeted marketing because the
Ordinance regulates companies’ business conduct, as opposed to
141
their speech.
Unlike toy incentives offered in kids’ meals, the
Court deemed the information at issue in Sorrell “speech” because it
was “essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human
142
affairs.”
Here, the language of the Ordinance specifically states:
“[t]he City does not seek to limit or regulate any speech,
communication or advertising on the part of any restaurant in any
manner. Nor does the City seek to ban entirely the practice of tying
143
free toys with children’s meals.”
The distinction is important
because of the constitutional issues raised by opponents of the FTC’s
144
efforts to restrict junk food advertisements aimed at children.
At
most, the Healthy Food Ordinance would have an indirect impact on
commercial speech because companies would have to change their
145
advertising schemes.
As the Supreme Court noted in Sorrell, the
First Amendment does not preclude regulations governing conduct
146
or commerce that merely inflict incidental burdens on speech.
2.

Marketing partnerships
While the foregoing reasons demonstrate why restaurants
providing toys in kids’ meals would not have a valid claim against the
Healthy Food Ordinance on commercial speech grounds, companies
that form marketing contracts with these restaurants to promote their
147
movie, television show, or apparel may have a viable claim.
For
141. See Diller & Graff, supra note 103, at 92 tbl.2 (categorizing Santa Clara’s
Healthy Food Ordinance as an attempt to regulate business operations).
142. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011).
143. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink).
144. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the constitutional hurdles that thwarted earlier
government attempts to restrict child-targeted marketing).
145. The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed advertisements as commercial
speech. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
(permitting First Amendment protection for advertisements containing liquor
prices); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (employing First Amendment protection for advertisements listing
prescription drug prices).
146. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664–65 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502
(1949).
147. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 148 (detailing the history of the Happy Meal toy
from offering a McDonald’s character figurine in its primary years to today’s practice
of offering toys tied with major motion pictures). In August 2011, McDonald’s
launched a three-week campaign in partnership with Skechers, offering toy versions
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example, capitalizing on the marketing potential of fifty-eight million
customers who frequent McDonald’s on a daily basis, Twentieth
Century Fox (Fox) formed a partnership with McDonald’s in 2009 to
148
For movie
promote five of its upcoming blockbuster releases.
studios like Fox, the packaging of, and the toy incentives in, Happy
Meals are the ideal way to advertise their recent or upcoming film
releases to millions of prospective movie viewers, some of whom the
149
studio may not have reached with other forms of advertising. Even
though this commercial expression comes in the form of a toy, the
Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment protects
150
more than mere spoken or written words.
The Court’s liberal
interpretation of “speech” supports the contention that the Healthy
151
Food Ordinance infringes upon movie studios’ protected speech.
Therefore, this Comment next analyzes the constitutionality of the
Healthy Food Ordinance under the assumption that it does regulate
152
speech.
Surviving Central Hudson
If the Healthy Food Ordinance constitutes a restriction of
commercial speech, it would be subject to intermediate scrutiny
153
under Central Hudson.
Comparisons with Lorillard and the FTC’s
failed attempt to restrict child-targeted advertising provide an
insightful lens through which to analyze the legality of the Healthy
3.

of Twinkle Toes, Skechers Kids’ sneakers for girls. Karlene Lukovitz, McD’s Latest
Happy Meal Toys: Mini Skechers, MEDIAPOST NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011, 12:31 PM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=157436.
148. McDonald’s has also formed partnerships with other major film studios, such
as Disney and DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc. See Claudia Eller, Twentieth Century
Fox Orders Up Movie Pact with McDonald’s, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/14/business/fi-ct-mcfox14 (reporting that
Disney ended its ten-year partnership with McDonald’s because the studio wanted to
separate itself from fast food after launching a healthy-eating campaign).
149. See id. (revealing that the use of Happy Meal toys and packaging to promote
recent releases is a popular marketing tool for movie studios that are trying to cut
back on their advertising costs).
150. In depicting the versatility and comprehensiveness of the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court asserted that symbolism in the form of the “unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky
verse of Lewis Carroll” still constitutes speech. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1985).
151. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (declaring prescriber-identifying information for
pharmaceutical marketing purposes a form speech).
152. See infra Part II.A.3 (applying the Central Hudson test to analyze whether the
Healthy Food Ordinance would survive commercial speech challenges).
153. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (following the
precedent of Central Hudson to assess the constitutionality of regulations limiting
commercial speech).
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Food Ordinance under the commercial speech doctrine.
A court would likely uphold the Ordinance under Central Hudson
because a municipality has a substantial interest in safeguarding
children’s health, which the Ordinance directly advances, and the
regulation is no more extensive than necessary to achieve this
interest. As long as the toy promotion is not false, misleading, or
155
unlawful, it would at least survive the first prong of Central Hudson.
The Healthy Food Ordinance would pass the second prong of the
Central Hudson test under the same rationale adopted in Lorillard—
the Court relied on policy-based reasoning to conclude that states
had a legitimate concern to regulate minors’ consumption of tobacco
products when tobacco use at the time was the most pressing health
156
issue in the United States.
In Lorillard, the Court explained that
children lack the cognitive abilities to recognize the persuasive ploys
157
of advertising.
As previously discussed, food purveyors similarly
recognize the vulnerability of children as marketing subjects and
158
utilize techniques that directly target child consumers. Contrary to
the food industry’s claim that its marketing practices only influence
children’s brand preferences, the World Health Organization
154. Like the regulations at issue in Lorillard, the Healthy Food Ordinance
represents the government’s attempt to protect children from marketing that could
adversely impact their health. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.2 (2011),
available at http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health
Code” hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink)
(stating the Ordinance’s purpose to promote healthier eating habits among
children, particularly when they eat out at restaurants); see also Lorillard, 533 U.S. at
533 (citing the goals of the restrictions on tobacco advertisements as trying to
decrease the high number of adolescent smokers).
155. In 1992, McDonald’s Happy Meal promotion of Batman Returns generated
public outrage among parents who blamed the fast food corporation for prompting
young children to see such a graphically violent movie. See Anne Thompson & Pat
H.
Broeske,
Hawking
‘Batman,’
ENT.
WKLY.
(July
10,
1992),
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,311012,00.html
(conveying
concerns
that
McDonald’s falsely promoted Batman Returns as an appropriate film for children).
This would likely be the type of false or misleading “speech” that would not warrant
First Amendment protection.
156. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 570; see supra Introduction (characterizing childhood
obesity as a major health concern).
157. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 558 (referencing the Surgeon General’s report and
the Institute of Medicine’s findings supporting the significant influence tobacco
advertisements had on young people’s decision to smoke cigarettes). Unlike the
physicians who were the targeted audience in Sorrell, and whom the Supreme Court
deemed were “sophisticated and experienced consumers,” the government here has
a greater obligation to protect children from influential marketing. See Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775
(1993)).
158. See Hill, supra note 4, at 109 (holding marketing tactics aimed at promoting
junk food directly to children partly responsible for the prevalence of childhood
obesity); see also supra Part I.A.1 (illustrating the powerful effect kids’ meal toys have
in attracting child consumers).
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concluded that the commercial advancement of high-calorie, low159
nutrient products adversely affects children’s health.
While the regulations in Lorillard failed the third prong of the
Court’s Central Hudson analysis, the Healthy Food Ordinance would
likely survive this prong because its nutritional standards directly
160
advance the government’s interest in promoting children’s health.
Kids’ meal toys were specifically designed to incite children to
161
relentlessly pester their parents to buy them fast food.
In
behavioral psychology, rewarding an individual for a purchase
decision is a form of operant conditioning, which becomes
162
problematic when the reward reinforces bad or unhealthy behavior.
Unlike in Lorillard, where the Court disallowed Massachusetts’s pointof-purchase restrictions because they failed to reasonably relate to the
government’s aims to dissuade minors from smoking tobacco, the
Healthy Food Ordinance directly advances the government’s interest
163
in encouraging healthier eating habits among children.
The
Ordinance’s nutritional standards are not based on some arbitrary
figure but instead parallel what has scientifically been found to be the
164
acceptable maximums for children. Therefore, restrictions on toys
in kids’ meals that exceed 600 calories or 650 milligrams of sodium
do not constitute unreasonable, blanket requirements, as was the case
165
with the outdoor ban and point-of-purchase restrictions in Lorillard.
On the contrary, these restrictions were thoughtfully and rationally
166
designed to promote healthier food options for children.
Finally, the Healthy Food Ordinance satisfies the fourth prong of

159. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MARKETING OF FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES TO
CHILDREN 1 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/
publications/Oslo%20meeting%20layout%2027%20NOVEMBER.pdf;
see
supra
Introduction (articulating the significant impacts marketing has on children).
160. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566–67 (noting that the blanket height restrictions
on the point-of-purchase display of tobacco products do not directly advance the
State’s goal in limiting children’s access to such products because not all youths are
under five-feet tall, and even if they were, they could still look up and see the packets
of cigars and smokeless tobacco).
161. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at 43 (discussing the notion of pester power).
162. See Joanna Hull, Playing with Children’s Minds: The Psychological Effects of
Tobacco Advertisements on Children, 1 YORK SCHOLAR 1, 3 (2004) (citing Camel
cigarette’s “Camel Cash” promotion as a form of operant condition—enticing youths
to buy cigarettes to be rewarded with free sunglasses and other giveaways).
163. Cf. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 567 (holding that the blanket height restriction does
not reasonably further the State’s aim to decrease underage tobacco usage).
164. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 47.
165. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 534.
166. Cf. id. at 566–67 (overturning Massachusetts’s ban on outdoor tobacco
advertisements because the Attorney General unreasonably imposed requirements
that did not take into consideration the specific and differing impacts they would
have on the public depending on where individuals lived).
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Central Hudson because it is not more extensive than necessary to
serve San Francisco’s interest. The advertisements at issue in Lorillard
and in the FTC’s advertising ban were deemed unconstitutional
167
because they unlawfully limited adults’ access to advertisements.
Even though in both cases the restrictions were aimed at protecting
children’s health and limiting their exposure to harmful products,
they were not narrowly tailored to satisfy the fourth prong of the
168
Central Hudson test.
Here, the Healthy Food Ordinance likely
avoids these same constitutional pitfalls.
The Healthy Food
Ordinance does not have broad, sweeping effects that also adversely
169
impact adult consumers.
Therefore, this case is distinguishable
from Lorillard and prior attempts to restrict child-directed marketing
because taking away toys in certain kids’ meals would only impact
170
children.
Moreover, San Francisco has already implemented less intrusive
efforts aimed at childhood obesity, and these efforts further
distinguish the Ordinance from earlier attempts to restrict marketing
to children. In describing the purpose of the Ordinance, San
Francisco outlined the numerous community programs it already
offers—encouraging children to walk or ride their bicycles to school,
discouraging soda consumption, and increasing families’ access to
wholesome foods—which address some of the contributing factors of
171
childhood obesity.
Additionally, because it only imposes limited
restrictions—as opposed to outright bans, which was the case with
earlier efforts aimed at childhood obesity—the Ordinance provides
an incentive for restaurants to make the changes necessary to provide
172
and promote more wholesome meals to children.
These other
measures demonstrate why the Healthy Food Ordinance is necessary
and not excessive in addressing this multi-faceted issue.
C. Interference with Substantive Due Process
Even though the Ordinance survives dormant Commerce Clause
167. Id. at 561–63.
168. Id. at 561.
169. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at 47 (explaining that Happy Meal toys
advertisements are aimed at children aged three to nine).
170. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 581.
171. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (listing the
various other initiatives in San Francisco designed to improve children’s health).
172. Cf. Pecquet, supra note 24 (quoting Professor Howard Beales, who pointed
out that outright bans on products disincentivize companies from making
improvements).
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analysis and reconciles First Amendment issues that hampered
previous childhood obesity regulations, it raises concerns of
paternalism. Prior to the passage of the Healthy Food Ordinance,
the restaurant industry lobbied hard to thwart its approval, basing its
173
arguments on constitutional grounds.
The passage of the
Ordinance garnered public criticism from consumers who fear the
174
It even captured the
ban signifies “a paternalistic slippery slope.”
attention of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, which satirized the future
of the “Crappy Meal”—devoid of its fun and colorful packaging and
instead equipped with the Periodic Table of Elements, CPR
instructions, and a toy figurine of Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the
175
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Because of the Ordinance’s paternalistic implications, substantive
due process is the most logical doctrinal tool for assessing its
176
constitutionality. Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has traditionally recognized parents’ right to raise
their children without government interference as a fundamental
177
interest.
From a practical standpoint, however, it would be
ridiculous to imagine that anyone would challenge the Ordinance on
these grounds, let alone that a court would find the Ordinance
deserves strict scrutiny review. Nevertheless, the Healthy Food
Ordinance lays the groundwork for states and municipalities to
173. See Gordon, supra note 14 (relaying California Restaurant Association
spokesman Daniel Conway’s concerns that the Ordinance may violate First
Amendment liberties).
174. In 2008, Mississippi Representative John Read proposed statewide legislation
that would prohibit restaurants from serving obese customers. Nanci Hellmich,
Restaurants as Obesity Cops Doesn’t Sit Well, USA TODAY (Feb. 5, 2008, 11:07 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-02-05-obesity-restaurant-law_n.htm.
Although Representative Read admitted the bill was merely aimed to raise public
awareness of the issue, and not actually be enacted, such a proposal reveals the type
of legal interventions that might follow the Healthy Food Ordinance. Id. But see
Bernstein, supra note 101 (noting that some consumers believe their municipalities
should enact similar bans that prohibit play areas at fast food restaurants).
175. The Daily Show, supra note 12.
176. See Travis Ramon, San Francisco to Take Away Parents’ Rights: Ban on Happy
Meals Coming, YAHOO! VOICES (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.associatedcontent.com/
article/5990420/san_francisco_to_take_away_parents_pg2.html?cat=5 (contending
that the Healthy Food Ordinance’s limitations on the options parents have when
ordering kids’ meals for their children is overly intrusive and an abuse of the
government’s police powers).
177. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (identifying parents’ care over
their children as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by [the Supreme] Court”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (categorizing a
parent’s authority over one’s children as a fundamental right); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(asserting the right to protect family autonomy by controlling the upbringing of
one’s children).
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extend their authority from the public to private realms.
Theoretically, if San Francisco can determine what meals are too
unhealthy in restaurants, what is stopping local municipalities from
setting limits on how many calories or how much sodium parents may
feed their children at home?
Therefore, assessing whether
municipalities, like San Francisco, have a compelling interest in
restricting what parents feed their children warrants careful
consideration.
Using Lorillard and West Coast Hotel to frame San Francisco’s
compelling interests
The Supreme Court has traditionally held that state or municipal
laws that are enacted to ensure the health, safety, and general welfare
178
of its people do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
These
laws, however, were primarily aimed at communicable diseases that
179
posed a threat to the entire population. Setting aside the debate of
whether obesity constitutes a “public health” issue, the Ordinance still
advances two compelling interests—the first of which is protecting
the health and well-being of children by making unhealthy food less
180
enticing.
Although a court has never had the opportunity to formally
determine that preventing childhood obesity constitutes a
“compelling” government interest, a comparison can be made with
the Supreme Court’s view toward minors’ usage of tobacco products.
In his concurring opinion in Lorillard, Justice Thomas highlighted the
parallels between the high mortality rates resulting from tobacco use
181
and obesity. He acknowledged that even though fast food has not
been found to be addictive in the same way that science has found
tobacco to be, fast food marketing that targets child consumers can
1.

178. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“[A] state is not without
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their
physical or mental health is jeopardized.”); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (noting that the
private sphere of family life is not immune from government regulation in the
furtherance of the public interest); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(overturning a parent’s challenges to the constitutionality of a regulation because
the government had a legitimate interest in protecting public safety); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878) (same).
179. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (upholding Massachusetts’s compulsory
vaccination law).
180. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (articulating
the Healthy Food Ordinance’s goal to “increase the likelihood that parents will make
healthier choices for their children when eating out”).
181. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 588 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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have equally “deleterious consequences that are difficult to
182
Just as the Supreme Court in Lorillard characterized
reverse.”
Massachusetts’s interest in restricting minors’ tobacco usage as
“substantial, and even compelling,” so too would a court find that the
183
Healthy Food Ordinance advances a compelling interest.
According to the Institute of Medicine’s June 2011 report on
childhood obesity, “slightly more than twenty percent of children
184
between the ages of two and five are already overweight or obese.”
Proponents of the Ordinance point out that the restrictions level the
playing field between persuasive junk food marketers and parents
185
who struggle to get their children to eat more wholesome foods. In
light of continually increasing rates of obesity and other diet-related
illnesses among children and the influential role fast food marketers
play in children’s food preferences, the government’s involvement in
186
promoting healthier food choices is both pressing and necessary.
The second compelling interest pertains to the Ordinance’s
attempt to quell rising healthcare expenses related to diet-related
187
illnesses that impose economic burdens on taxpayers.
As the
Supreme Court established in its West Coast Hotel decision, the
government has a compelling interest in regulating matters that have
188
economically adverse impacts on its citizens. Childhood obesity is a
substantial concern for states and municipalities because its
189
economic costs continue into adulthood.
With $168 billion being
182. Id. at 587; see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the persuasive impact toy
incentives have on children and their food choices).
183. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562 (explaining that despite it being a compelling
interest, the regulations at issue did not narrowly target minors, but affected adults as
well, for whom smoking tobacco is a lawful activity).
184. INST. OF MED., EARLY CHILDHOOD OBESITY PREVENTION POLICIES 1 (2011),
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13124&page=1.
185. See Bernstein, supra note 101 (maintaining that it took years for one
consumer to get her daughter to eat healthy food after going through a period of
frequenting McDonald’s just to get the Happy Meal toy).
186. See supra Part I (detailing the current food environment and why new
regulations, like the Healthy Food Ordinance, may be needed).
187. See Nancy Hellmich, Rising Obesity Will Cost U.S. Health Care $344 Billion a Year,
USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2009 10:17 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/
weightloss/2009-11-17-future-obesity-costs_N.htm (estimating obesity-related healthcare costs to reach $344 billion by 2018).
188. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (allowing the State
of Washington to enact a law regulating minimum wage on the grounds that it
advanced a compelling state interest by not only preventing the unlawful
exploitation of workers but also protecting taxpayers from bearing the burden of
paying the workers’ lost wages). But see Jacob Sullum, The War on Fat: Is the Size of
Your Butt the Government’s Business?, REASON (Aug./Sept. 2004), available at
http://reason.com/archives/2004/08/01/the-war-on-fat/singlepage
(contending
that the logic of this argument could be extended to allow the government’s
involvement in such mundane and personal issues as “whether you floss regularly”).
189. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at
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spent annually on obesity—over sixteen percent of the nation’s
healthcare expenses—the direct and indirect effects of obesity are
190
A recent White
financially burdensome and all-encompassing.
House press release emphasized the widespread impact of childhood
obesity, stating that this “is not just a health or family issue alone. It is
an economic issue that impacts workforces, job growth, and local
191
budgets across the country.”
2.

The Ordinance’s narrow-tailoring
In addition to advancing compelling government interests, the
Healthy Food Ordinance is narrowly tailored and would survive strict
192
scrutiny.
The Ordinance specifically provides that it does not aim
to regulate fast food companies’ advertising nor ban the practice of
193
providing toys with kids’ meals altogether. Therefore, parents may
still purchase meals that contain toys so long as the kids’ meal satisfies
the Ordinance’s nutritional requirements; and yet, parents still have
the option to purchase meals that do not satisfy those nutritional
194
limits.
Consequently, the Healthy Food Ordinance is not overly
burdensome and is arguably the least restrictive way to help parents
select the most wholesome option for their children when eating
195
out.
Because the Healthy Food Ordinance would likely survive
strict scrutiny, it would also pass rational basis review, and

http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (“As children
and adolescents in San Francisco become adults, their high rates of obesity and
overweight are likely to contribute to the already high economic costs of healthcare
and loss of productivity associated with adult obesity in San Francisco.”); see also Carla
Fried, McDonald’s Hit by Happy Meal Toy Ban, CBS NEWS: MONEY WATCH (Nov. 4,
2010,
11:50
AM),
http://moneywatch.bnet.com/economic-news/blog/dailymoney/mcdonalds-hit-by-happy-meal-toy-ban/1510/ (attributing increased health
insurance costs and Medicare expenses to the rising rates of obesity and other dietrelated illnesses).
190. See Fried, supra note 189 (citing a recent study conducted by Cornell
regarding the economic costs of obesity).
191. See Press Release, White House, Remarks by the First Lady at National League
of Cities Conference (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/03/15/remarks-first-lady-national-league-cities-conference
(delineating how childhood obesity adversely impacts balancing the budget and
allowing economic growth in communities).
192. See also supra Part II.B.3 (analyzing the Healthy Food Ordinance under the
fourth step of Central Hudson and finding that the requirements are not more
extensive than necessary; therefore, the Ordinance is a narrowly tailored way to
achieve the government’s interest in protecting children’s health).
193. HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (clarifying that the Ordinance solely aims at
improving the eating habits of children in San Francisco).
194. Id.
195. See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining that the Ordinance is not overly burdensome
because it is restricted to children’s meals).
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accordingly, the Ordinance would not violate the Fourteenth
196
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
III. WHAT IS NEXT? RESPONSE TO THE ORDINANCE AND FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS
A. National Impact: Additional Legal Measures and Industry Changes
Following the passage of the Ordinance, analogous regulations
have appeared, foreshadowing the national impact this ban could
197
have on fast food chains and on the public health.
In New York
City—another city that has been aggressive in legislating to combat
obesity—Councilman Leroy Comrie proposed to enact a similar ban
198
with even stricter health requirements.
Similarly, in a class action
lawsuit, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) sued
McDonald’s for using Happy Meal toys to unlawfully exploit
199
children’s inability to recognize predatory advertising practices. If
CSPI prevails, the ban on toys in certain kids’ meals could become a
200
nationwide standard.
In response to the Ordinance and mounting pressures, companies
within the fast food industry have taken divergent approaches. For
example, following the enactment of the toy bans in San Francisco
and Santa Clara, Jack in the Box announced that it would not only
start providing healthier kids’ meal options but that it would also

196. Rational basis is a more flexible standard of review; therefore, it is not
necessary to analyze the Ordinance under this test because it likely survives strict
scrutiny. See supra Part I.C.3 (suggesting that the Ordinance would pass strict
scrutiny because it advances compelling interests and is narrowly tailored). See
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1282
(2007) (describing rational basis review as more highly deferential than strict
scrutiny).
197. See Fried, supra note 189 (clarifying that San Francisco was not the first region
to restrict toy marketing by fast food restaurants and suggesting similar ordinances
may appear nationwide).
198. See Julie Gunlock, New York Introduces the Un-Happy Meal, NAT’L REV. ONLINE
(Apr.
5,
2011),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/263974/new-yorkintroduces-un-happy-meal-julie-gunlock (criticizing New York’s proposed standards,
which are modeled after San Francisco’s Healthy Food Ordinance).
199. See Amended Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp.,
No. CGC-10-506178 (S.F. Cty. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) (accusing McDonald’s of using
deceptive and unfair advertising practices to bait children and to obtain an unfair
advantage over its competitors who choose not to give away toys); see also Dan Levine,
McDonald’s vs. Mom in Happy Meal Lawsuit, MSNBC.COM (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:30 PM),
http://forum.purseblog.com/up-to-the-minute/mcdonalds-vs-mom-in-happy-meallawsuit-677605.html (explaining that McDonald’s removed the suit to federal court
in California).
200. See Fried, supra note 189 (suggesting that CSPI would like the toy ban to
eventually be implemented nationwide).
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201

discontinue selling toys with meals for children.
Although McDonald’s denies being influenced by the passage of
202
the Healthy Food Ordinance or these other legal measures, it made
203
In July 2011,
subsequent changes to its Happy Meal offerings.
McDonald’s announced that it will not only serve apple slices without
the previously included caramel sauce, but apples will be a default
204
side in all Happy Meals.
French fries will continue to come as a
205
default item, but the serving size will be reduced. Additionally, fatfree chocolate milk and one-percent-fat white milk will be offered as
206
drink options. McDonald’s has also promised to continue reducing
sodium, sugars, saturated fat, and calories, as well as introduce more
207
fruit and vegetable options over the next several years.
Most significantly, McDonald’s announced—the day before the
Ordinance was to go into effect—that parents can still buy toys for
their children at each of the nineteen McDonald’s locations in San
Francisco, regardless of whether the meal complies with the
208
Ordinance. Parents need only pay an extra ten cents, which will be
209
The actions taken by McDonald’s underscore
donated to charity.
201. See Lisa Jennings, Jack in the Box Makes Big Menu Changes, NATION’S
RESTAURANT NEWS (June 17, 2011), http://nrn.com/article/jack-box-makes-bigmenu-changes (noting that despite the restaurant’s denial that it was being
motivated by outside pressures, Jack in the Box would end its twenty-year practice of
providing toys in kids’ meals and would also add healthier menu alternatives).
202. See Rexrode, supra note 32 (revealing that despite these changes occurring
amidst recent regulations, such as the Healthy Food Ordinance, Cindy Goody, the
senior director of nutrition for McDonald’s, denies the changes are related to the
Ordinance and instead asserts they are a response to customers requesting healthier
choices).
203. See Press Release, McDonald’s, McDonald’s USA: Commitments to Offer
Improved Nutrition Choices (July 26, 2011) [hereinafter McDonald’s Press Release],
available at http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/newsroom/electronic_
press_kits/mcdonalds_usa_commitments_to_offer_improved_nutrition_choices.html
(outlining its plan to provide more wholesome kids’ meals); see also Happy Meal Gets a
Makeover, supra note 131 (asserting that the changes to Happy Meals are scheduled to
begin in September 2011, with all 14,000 McDonald’s chains in the United States to
adopt this plan by the first quarter of 2012).
204. See McDonald’s Press Release, supra note 203 (disclosing that McDonald’s is
also exploring alternatives to apples, such as other forms of produce and low-fat dairy
items).
205. See id. (explaining that customers may request an extra bag of apples as an
alternative side to French fries).
206. See id. (estimating that these changes will decrease the calories in Happy
Meals by as much as twenty percent).
207. See id. (announcing that McDonald’s plans to reduce the sodium by fifteen
percent on all menu items by 2015 and adjust serving sizes to decrease added sugars,
saturated fat, and calories by 2020).
208. See Stephanie Strom, For A Dime, McDonald’s Beats a Toy Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 2011, at B5 (explaining that McDonald’s will continue to make toys available to
customers because the company feels Happy Meals would not have the same appeal
without the trinkets).
209. Id.
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210

its attempt to circumvent the restrictions of the Ordinance. While
some health experts lament this as a loss for health advocates in the
211
battle against childhood obesity and diabetes, health officials in San
Francisco assert that this is just the beginning of the government’s
attempts to strengthen the Ordinance and improve children’s
212
health.
B. Potential Regulatory Responses
San Francisco’s most successful response to the McDonald’s Happy
Meal changes would be to implement economic regulations on toys
sold separately from kids’ meals. According to the Supreme Court in
213
Nebbia v. New York, “a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to
214
enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose,” as long as
215
it is not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.”
The power to
impose a price differential on a product was extended to cities in
216
People v. Cook. There, the court validated New York City’s authority
to impose a price differential on cigarettes, depending upon their tar
217
and nicotine content. It asserted that a city’s exercise of its police
powers is valid as long as the regulation is reasonably related to
promoting the public health, and the means of enforcement do not
218
exceed the limits of the city’s police powers.
1.

Setting a price floor
Following the principles established in Nebbia and Cook, San

210. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.4 (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml
(follow
“Health
Code”
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8: Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (prohibiting
the provision of a free toy incentive with kids’ meals that do not meet the established
nutritional requirements).
211. See Strom, supra note 208 (“In the battle over children’s health, this is a win
for obesity and diabetes.”).
212. Dr. Rajiv Bhatia, director of occupational and environmental health at San
Francisco’s Department of Public Health, asserted that the city was going to learn
from McDonald’s response and “do what’s necessary to improve regulation.” Id.
213. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
214. Id. at 537.
215. Id. at 525. Indeed, states have only acquired greater latitude to implement
economic regulations since the Court’s decision in Nebbia and the end of the Lochner
era. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“[I]t is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
[regulation].”).
216. 312 N.E.2d 452 (N.Y. 1974).
217. Id. at 455–56 (finding that the New York State Constitution’s “home rule”
provision properly granted municipalities, like New York City, the authority to
exercise police powers).
218. Id.
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Francisco could implement a statute fixing a minimum price at which
toys must be sold if the kids’ meals they accompany do not meet the
219
A law mandating that toys
Ordinance’s health requirements.
accompanying unhealthy kids’ meals be sold at fair market value
would help thwart companies, like McDonald’s, from giving away toys
virtually for free. For the following reasons, this regulation would
meet all the requirements outlined in Nebbia and Cook, thereby
constituting a valid exercise of police power.
First, California’s Constitution has explicitly delegated the
220
authority to exercise police powers to cities, like San Francisco.
This is the preliminary step in analyzing the legality of a local law,
221
and it was the first issue the court addressed in Cook. Second, a law
implementing a price differential on toys based on the nutritional
content of the kids’ meals they accompany closely parallels the law
upheld in Cook, which imposed a price differential on cigarettes
222
based upon their tar and nicotine content.
Accordingly, a court
would likely find that a regulation establishing the price of toys in
kids’ meals falls well within the realm of San Francisco’s delegated
police powers—it would not infringe upon any other constitutional
or general law, and the California State Legislature has not
223
preempted San Francisco’s ability to exercise this power.
Third, the implementation of a price floor is reasonably related to
San Francisco’s interest in promoting its citizens’ health and wellbeing. As discussed in the beginning of this Comment, toys and
other incentive items offered with kids’ meals are successful
marketing tactics utilized by fast food companies to attract child
224
consumers. And while there are numerous contributing factors to
the obesity epidemic, research has established that high-calorie meals
225
consumed outside the home are at least partially responsible.
Consequently, it is reasonable for San Francisco to conclude that
higher prices for toys purchased in conjunction with unhealthy kids’
219. For example, San Francisco could increase the price to fair market value or at
least to the cost of production of these toys.
220. See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (“A county or city may make and enforce within its
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict
with general laws.”).
221. See Cook, 312 N.E.2d at 455–56 (citing the New York State Constitution’s
“home rule” provision as expressly granting localities police powers).
222. Id.
223. See id. at 455 (identifying these issues as two potential limitations on a city’s
police power).
224. Supra Part I.A.3.
225. See Hill, supra note 4, at 110 (suggesting that the obesity epidemic can be
partially attributed to the high fat and high sugar menu offerings at fast food
restaurants and the more recent trend toward super-sized “extra value” meals).
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226

A local law requiring
meals would result in lower rates of obesity.
companies to sell toys in kids’ meals at fair market value or at the cost
of production, therefore, would not exceed San Francisco’s police
powers.
2.

Instituting an excise tax
San Francisco could also implement a tax on toys sold in
conjunction with meals that do not meet the health standards of the
227
Ordinance. Under California law, charter cities, like San Francisco,
have the authority to “make and enforce all ordinances and
228
regulations in respect to municipal affairs.” Because local taxes fall
229
under the umbrella of “municipal affairs,” cities may institute a
local tax as long as the tax is not restricted by its own charter or
230
preempted by state law. Here, neither California state law nor San
Francisco local law prohibits San Francisco from imposing an excise
231
tax on toys in kids’ meals.
Therefore, San Francisco could tax
restaurants selling toys in conjunction with unhealthy kids’ meals that
do not meet the health requirements imposed by the Ordinance.
Moreover, a “sin tax” to discourage the consumption of unhealthy
232
foods and beverages is not a new idea to California. In the past few
226. Cf. Cook, 312 N.E.2d at 455 (explaining the rationale behind New York’s
law—to force consumers to pay higher retail prices for more harmful cigarettes—and
finding it reasonably related to the city’s interest in ensuring its citizens’ health).
227. Some cities adopt a city charter, which is like a constitution for local affairs.
See Miller v. City of Sacramento, 136 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1977) (defining
city charters).
228. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 5.
229. See W. Coast Adver. Co. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.2d 138, 143 (Cal. 1939)
(“No doubt is entertained upon the proposition that the levy of taxes by a
municipality for revenue purposes, including license taxes, is strictly a municipal
affair.”).
230. See Roble Vista Assocs. v. Bacon, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 297 (Ct. App. 2002)
(conveying that preemption exists when a local law attempts to legislate in an area
that is explicitly or implicitly regulated by state law).
231. An excise tax is typically imposed on a business selling a commodity related
to a specific act or the enjoyment of a privilege, such as smoking cigarettes. See
United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of Cigarettes, More or Less, 448 F.3d 1168, 1184–
85 (9th Cir. 2006) (classifying the California cigarette tax law under question as an
excise tax).
232. See Kim Geiger & Tom Hamburger, States Poised to Become New Battleground in
Soda Tax Wars, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, at A22 (reporting California legislators’
attempt to pass a bill taxing soda consumption in light of studies revealing the strong
correlation between sugary soda consumption and obesity). While the efforts to
implement a statewide soda tax ultimately failed, new research from the University of
California, San Francisco, and Columbia University seems to have breathed new life
into the debate. Their research revealed that a national tax on soda would not only
raise $13 billion each year but save taxpayers $17 billion from decreased medical
expenditures. Karen Kaplan, Soda Tax Could Prevent 26,000 Premature Deaths, Study
Finds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/10/news/laheb-soda-tax-diabetes-obesity-20120110.
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years, California and a dozen other states have considered
restructuring their taxes on soft drinks because of the strong
233
The
evidence linking soda drinkers with poor health conditions.
health goals behind taxing sugary beverages are twofold: (1) the tax
reduces consumption; and (2) the tax raises revenue to help fund
school health programs, build parks, and support other recreational
234
activities.
Similarly, a tax on toys accompanying unhealthy kids’
meals would not only prevent companies from circumventing the
Ordinance, but it would also raise money to help fund health
education programs in San Francisco.
C. Implications of the Ordinance and Future Measures
The Healthy Food Ordinance epitomizes the progression toward
cleverer, yet more invasive, attempts to regulate obesity, raising
important issues pertaining to the future of these regulations. From
point-of-purchase labeling requirements at fast food and big chain
235
236
237
restaurants, to soda taxes, bans on trans fats, fast food zoning
238
239
ordinances, and even restrictions on food stamps, legislation
aimed at curtailing obesity has become particularly pervasive in
233. In 2010, Colorado passed a bill to tax soft drinks. See Geiger & Hamburger,
supra note 232 (noting that 12 states are considering altering taxes on soft drinks,
and that Colorado’s legislature recently passed a bill changing the tax treatment of
such beverages).
234. Id.
235. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205,
124 Stat. 119, 573–74 (2010) (requiring restaurants with twenty or more locations to
display calorie information for food items on their menus and menu boards,
including drive-through menu boards).
236. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the growing prevalence of “sin taxes” on soft
drinks); see also Kelly D. Brownell & Thomas R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention—The
Public Policy Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805, 1805
(2009) (indicating that forty states already have some sort of sugary beverage tax and
that several of these states are considering increasing this tax in response to the
obesity epidemic).
237. See, e.g., Thomas J. Lueck & Kim Severson, New York Bans Most Trans Fats in
Restaurants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1 (declaring New York as the first city in the
United States to ban restaurants’ use of trans fats).
238. See generally JULIE SAMIA MAIR ET AL., THE USE OF ZONING TO RESTRICT FAST
FOOD OUTLETS: A POTENTIAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT OBESITY 1–4 (2005), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Zoning%20Fast%20Food%20Outlets.pdf
(discussing existing zoning laws that limit the presence of fast food restaurants and
current case law).
239. In October 2010, Mayor Bloomberg requested permission from the federal
government to prevent 1.7 million New Yorkers in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) from purchasing sugar-sweetened beverages with their
food stamps for a two-year period to study whether it would positively impact health.
Anemona Hartocollis, Food Stamps As New Front in Soda Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010,
at A1. Similarly, Minnesota sought federal permission in 2004 to implement a ban
disallowing food-stamp recipients from purchasing junk food—a request ultimately
denied by the Department of Agriculture. Id. at A34.
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recent years. The reformation of food in the school setting has also
been at the forefront of this movement as numerous states have
implemented regulations prohibiting the sale of soft drinks on school
240
campuses. According to a study, during the 2009–2010 school year,
fourteen states banned soda in school vending machines, and
241
nineteen states disallowed the sale of soda in school cafeterias.
In
2003, Arkansas adopted an unprecedented approach to children’s
health by passing an act banning all vending machines from
elementary schools and requiring schools to provide parents with
report cards of their child’s body mass index (BMI), their child’s BMI
percentile by age, and an explanation of the health impacts related to
242
BMI, eating habits, and physical activity. Most recently, the Obama
243
Administration enacted the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010,
244
which sets new nutrition standards for school lunches.
While these measures aimed at obesity—including the Ordinance
and its possible responses—offer innovative ways to potentially
alleviate this pressing health problem, they undoubtedly raise
concerns of a paternalistic slippery slope. For example, when it
comes to taxing soft drinks or even toys in kids’ meals, where would
governments draw the line? In light of increased efforts to address
obesity and other health-related diseases, it would not be beyond the
realm of possibility for such “sin taxes” to next extend to the grocery
store—increasing the price of products deemed to be excessive in fat,
sugar, or calories—or even to activities unrelated to food
consumption. In fact, New York Assemblyman Felix Ortiz has already
proposed a bill seeking to tax pastimes generally associated with
sedentary lifestyles, including movie tickets, video games, and even
245
DVD rentals.
To an even greater extreme, Eric Topol, Former
Chief of Cardiology at the Cleveland Clinic, believes that slender
240. Nicole Ostrow, Banning Sugary Soda from School Fails to Cut Teen Consumption,
Study
Finds,
BLOOMBERG
(Nov.
7,
2011,
4:00
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-07/banning-sugary-soda-from-schoolsfails-to-cut-teen-consumption.html (noting that a number of states have implemented
bans on soft drinks in school, but that programs banning all sugary drinks were more
effective at reducing overall consumption of calorie-laden beverages).
241. Id.
242. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-135 (West 2011).
243. Pub. L. No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183 (2010).
244. In December 2010, the White House announced the passage of the Healthy,
Hunger-Free Kids Act, which, like the Healthy Food Ordinance, foreshadows the
movement toward increased government intervention because of parents’ inabilities
to ensure that their children consume healthful foods. Penny Starr, Michelle Obama
on Deciding What Kids Eat: “We Can’t Just Leave it Up to the Parents,” CNSNEWS.COM
(Dec. 13, 2010), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/michelle-obama-deciding-whatkids-eat-we-can-t-just-leave-it-parents.
245. Ceci Connolly, Public Policy Targeting Obesity, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at A1.
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taxpayers should receive a tax credit while “the people ruining our
246
health care economics would pay the standard tax.” And while the
reality of such legislation ever becoming law certainly appears
unfathomable, it is unlikely that parents and their children twentyfive years ago imagined that the toys in their kids’ meals would one
day be a point of contention and, in some cities, banned for health
reasons.
CONCLUSION
The questions and subsequent analysis pertaining to the Healthy
Food Ordinance’s constitutionality reveal its expansive reach and
expose pivotal implications for the future of anti-obesity laws and
regulations. Professor Mark Hall adeptly captured the complexity of
public health issues, like obesity, observing: “[v]iewed from one
perspective, these are issues of individual choice. Viewed from
another perspective, however, each of these is a public health
problem, one that justifies coercive government intervention to
247
prevent individuals’ choices from harming themselves or others.”
Indeed, the Healthy Food Ordinance falls within this gray area. On
one hand, it embodies a creative solution to the food industry’s
failure to adopt effective self-regulations and prior anti-obesity
measures’ constitutional pitfalls. Yet, on the other, the Ordinance
evokes paternalistic concerns regarding our most basic civil liberties.
Regardless of which perspective the Ordinance should be viewed
from, however, the Healthy Food Ordinance seriously calls into
question the constitutional framework that ensures our protected
liberties. There is something amiss when more invasive measures,
like the Healthy Food Ordinance, are almost certainly constitutional,
yet substantially more intrusive than their predecessors, such as bans
on junk food advertisements, which were stymied by the same
doctrinal tools. To tackle a complex issue such as childhood obesity,
while still preserving civil liberties, it is critical that these legal
doctrines evolve into a cohesive body of law that produces more
consistent results in the future.
246. See id. (reporting Topol’s declaration that if he were a government official, he
would require each citizen to submit to a weigh-in at the post office every tax day).
Equally ridiculous was Mississippi State Representative John Read’s proposed bill that
would require restaurants to refuse service to overweight customers. Hellmich, supra
note 174.
247. See Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSPS. IN
BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S206 (2003) (“Lacking any one specific agent on which to
focus health improvement strategies, the next best response is to target behaviors
that will decrease various statistical risk factors.”).

